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ABSTRACT
With a monetary union in place, many European countries are now debating if and how to coordinate
their tax policies. Of particular interest to EU ministers is taxation of mobile factors like capital.
Mendoza and Tesar (MT) use a game-theoretic approach to address the question, What is the
outcome of tax competition and tax coordination when countries choose the tax on capital income
and adjust other tax rates to keep revenues constant? MT predict very large welfare gains (losses) to
tax competition for European countries that had high (low) tax rates prior to ﬁnancial integration.
In particular they predict a large gain for the United Kingdom and a large loss for countries in
continental Europe. A second ﬁnding is that the welfare gains of tax coordination relative to that
of tax competition are small. I discuss these ﬁndings in light of current policy debates and possible
future extensions of this work.
∗This discussion was prepared for the 2004 Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy. I received very
helpful comments from my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the
Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
With a monetary union in place, many European countries are now debating if and how
to coordinate their tax policies. The European ministers are particularly interested in the
question of how to tax capital income so as \to prevent signicant losses of tax revenue; and
to help tax structures to develop in a more employment-friendly way, notably by reversing
the trend of an increasing tax burden on labor as compared with more mobile tax bases."1
Mendoza and Tesar use a game-theoretic approach to address the question, What is
the outcome of tax competition and tax coordination? They model countries as players in
a one-shot game choosing a tax rate on capital income taking as given the tax rates of other
countries. They consider two types of experiments: symmetric games between countries
starting with the same initial tax regimes and asymmetric games between countries starting
with dierent initial tax regimes (and hence dierent allocations). They compute equilibria
for noncooperative play and for cooperative play.
In my comments, I focus on two of MT's main ndings and relate them to policy
discussions in Europe. The rst nding is the outcome of a noncooperative game played
by asymmetric players, the United Kingdom and a representative of continental Europe
who choose capital tax rates taking as given tax rates of the other country and adjusting
their labor tax rates to keep revenues constant. MT assume that the United Kingdom
and continental Europe are identical in all respects except in their pre-game tax regimes.
For this asymmetric game, MT nd that the welfare gains to tax competition are large
and positive for citizens in the United Kingdom and large and negative for citizens of
continental Europe. This result is due to the fact that MT assume the United Kingdom
has high capital tax rates and a low capital stock prior to playing the tax competition
game. With tax competition, the UK lowers its tax rate from 53 percent to 20 percent,
inducing a large increase in the return on capital and an inux of capital from continental
Europe. Continental Europe, on the other hand, has to increase both capital and labor
tax rates to make up lost revenues to the UK.
1 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council and the European
Parliament (A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union) 1997.
1The results of the asymmetric game lead me to explore two sets of questions. First,
how should I view the optimization problems being solved by the countries in MT's model?
Two otherwise identical countries have very dierent policies (and allocations) in the pre-
game regime. What overall optimization problem leads us to these initial conditions?
Second, what assumptions of MT are critical for the quantitative results? MT assume one
type of capital with no foreign ownership. The only foreign asset is a bond with income
that is tax free. They also assume away any dynamic considerations and model the game
as a one-time choice of a capital tax rate.
The second nding of MT that I discuss is, in my view, the main nding of the paper
and answers the question, Are there gains to EU tax cooperation? In most of the games
they analyze, MT nd that the gains of tax coordination relative to that of tax competition
are small. The equilibrium capital income tax rates chosen in the noncooperative games
are very close to those chosen in the cooperative games. Furthermore, the welfare gains to
cooperating are small.
As with all interesting and provocative papers, this paper leads us to think about new
directions for research. I conclude with my thoughts on future directions.
2. Two-Country Games
MT compute equilibria for two-player one-shot games. The players are countries. The
action that each takes is to choose a capital tax rate k. MT consider two types of
equilibria: Nash and cooperative. Let me denote the outcome of the Nash game as  N
k
and the outcome of the cooperative game as C
k .
For the Nash game, MT solve
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2s:t: ct + xt + new bonds  wtlt + (1   k)rtkt + kkt
+ bonds   other taxes + transfers
kt+1 = (1   )kt + xt   (xt=kt)ktg
with initial values for k0 and bond holdings. The value function V  has the same form
with home variables replaced by foreign analogues and vice versa.
I have written the problem without specic notation for the bonds, other taxes, and
transfers. The intent is to show starkly that the model economies are standard one-sector
growth models. Furthermore, if the bond markets are not operating, the economies are
closed. If they are operating, the choice of foreign tax rate 
k can aect the home country
because rates of interest on foreign and domestic bonds are equated in equilibrium.
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For their applications, MT relate the outcomes of the games to the experience of con-
tinental European countries, namely France, Germany, and Italy, and to the experience
of the United Kingdom. They take tax regimes in the early 1980s as natural initial con-
ditions. They view the early 1980s as a period when nancial markets in Europe became
more integrated.
With these applications in mind, it is worth noting some of the critical assumptions
that MT make. First, there is no inherent dierence between countries. All individuals,
regardless of country of origin, have the same preferences. The same technologies are
available in all countries. MT do allow for the possibility that tax regimes are dierent
initially. This implies that initial capital stocks and bond holdings may dier.
Second, MT's model economy has only one type of capital. But the design of optimal
tax unions depends crucially on certain characteristics of capital, like its mobility, substi-
tutability, and tangibility. A house has very dierent characteristics than a patent although
3both are included in MT's capital stock k. Partly because of the dierent characteristics,
the tax treatment on dierent stocks varies in most countries.
A third important assumption that MT make concerns asset ownership. The only way
for foreign tax rates to aect the domestic households is through the bond market. MT
treat interest income as tax-free although it is not in the countries they consider. They
also assume that there is no direct foreign ownership of domestic equities or capital stocks,
despite the large observed rise in cross-ownership.
Finally, it is important to note that the game being analyzed is static. Countries choose
a single tax rate and commit to it forever. This has obvious drawbacks when comparing
the outcomes to the negotiations in Europe over tax competition and coordination.
3. Interpreting the Outcomes of the Games
Here, I discuss and interpret a subset of the experiments in MT. For these experiments,
I argue that the modeling assumptions I just described may be critical for some of the
ndings.
The experiments I consider are the Nash and cooperative capital income tax games
in which labor tax rates are adjusted to keep revenues xed. In Table 1, I show MT's
results (from Table 7) for two games: a symmetric game and an asymmetric game. In the
symmetric game, the two countries have the same initial tax rates and the same initial
capital stocks and bond holdings. In the asymmetric game, MT allow for dierent initial
tax rates, capital stocks, and bond holdings across the two countries.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows the results of a game played between two countries
with the same initial conditions. The pre-game tax rates on capital and labor are 27 and
37 percent, respectively. These rates are estimated averages for France, Germany, and
Italy in the early 1980s. MT's rationale is that the early 1980s is the period when barriers
to nancial integration were beginning to be overcome.
The lower panel of Table 1 shows the results of a game between the United Kingdom
and a representative of continental Europe. Notice that the initial tax rate on capital
4Table 1. Nash and Cooperative Equilibria of Capital Income Tax Gamesa
Tax Rates and Welfare Gains (in %)
Initial Nash Cooperateb
Symmetric Game:
Tax on Capital 27 27 37
Tax on Labor 37 37 34
Small gainsc .02 .28
Asymmetric Game:
Continent
Tax on Capital 27 30 34
Tax on Labor 37 40 38
Big lossesc -2.2 -2.0
UK
Tax on Capital 53 20 25
Tax on Labor 25 32 31
Big gainsc 3.9 4.0
a Labor tax rates are adjusted to make keep revenues constant.
b Tax rates and welfare gains are averages across equilibria.
c Percent of consumption required for indierence between policies.
for the United Kingdom at 53 percent is much higher than the 27 percent estimate for
continental Europe. On the other hand, the labor tax rate at 25 percent is much lower
than the 37 percent estimate for continental Europe.
Consider rst comparing the pre-game rates with the equilibrium rates from playing
Nash. If both countries start out in 1980 with tax rates of 27 and 37 percent on capital
and labor, respectively, then the Nash equilibrium outcomes are almost exactly the same.
Gains to tax competition are negligible (.02 percent). The asymmetric game, on the other
hand, implies large changes in U.K. tax rates and enormous welfare gains and losses. The
United Kingdom lowers its tax rate considerably from 53 percent to 20 percent. Because
the initial U.K. capital stock is at a low level, consistent with very high tax rates, there is a
5large inux of foreign investment to take advantage of the high return to capital. With an
alternative source of nancing, the U.K. consumption need not fall during the transition
period to a higher capital stock. Thus, the welfare gains are very high. For continental
Europe, on the other hand, tax rates have to rise to make up lost capital income tax
revenues. With both rates up, welfare falls and the loss is large.
It is important to consider these results in light of model assumptions. There are
no dierences in preferences or technologies across countries. Thus, we should question
why the United Kingdom chose to have such high tax rates on capital initially. What
overall optimization problem can account for the pre-game initial conditions and the game
outcomes?
MT's model has only one type of capital with its mobility dictated by the adjustment
cost function (x=k). A large fraction of the capital stock is housing and oce buildings
which are completely immobile. In fact most of the debates in Europe concern corporate
capital income tax rates and incomes from activities such as nancial services that are
highly mobile. If the United Kingdom lowers its corporate tax on capital, this does not
necessarily imply a signicant drop in the capital tax base of continental Europe.
Having multiple types of capital in the model can also have a large eect on the gains
to increased access to foreign asset markets. If individuals within a closed economy only
have access to one highly taxed asset, it is not surprising to nd that access to a second
low-tax asset can imply a large gain in welfare. If instead there are multiple types of
xed and nancial assets available within the domestic economy, then a change in one tax
implies a shift of investments to equate after-tax returns. It need not imply a large change
in the sequences of consumption and leisure. Thus, it need not imply a large gain or loss
in welfare.
To get a more accurate prediction of the winners and losers in tax competition, it
is also important that the national accounts and ow of funds in the model reect the
national accounts and ow of funds for Europe. If foreign asset holdings are large, it is not
clear whose welfare is being maximized.
6Another assumption that MT make that may be important for the results is that the
game is static. MT acknowledge that their exercise is a rst step and thus their results
may change if they take into account dynamic considerations.
Let me now turn to MT's results on the gains from cooperation. A comparison of
the second (`Nash') and third (`Cooperate') columns of Table 1 shows a robust result.
This comparison shows that the gain to cooperation is small. For the symmetric game,
the gain is only 0.26 percent of consumption. For the asymmetric game, the gain is even
smaller, between 0.1 to 0.2 percent. This is interesting in light of the current discussions
to coordinate on corporate income tax rates. MT show that there may be little gained
from such coordination.
4. Open Questions
In this section, I discuss some open and interesting issues related to European tax compe-
tition and cooperation.
MT do not analyze the recent Irish experience. Ireland currently has a 12.5 percent
corporate income tax rate. In many of the discussions about instituting lower bounds
on corporate rates, the Irish are held up as a reason not to do it. They have had lower
tax rates and spectacular growth in recent years. What would MT nd if they included
Ireland?
A better connection between the model assumptions and the country ow of funds
accounts is needed to understand who owns what and who gains or loses with tax compe-
tition. It is certainly not the case, as MT assume, that domestic capital is owned entirely
domestically. Foreign ownership is on the rise. How important are the foreign holdings for
the countries MT consider?
An extension to multiple capital stocks seems essential to accurately predict welfare
gains. Most of the policy debates are focused on specic types of capital and specic tax
rates. What is the outcome of corporate income tax competition and corporate income
tax coordination?
7In MT and most of the policy papers, there is a lot of discussion about revenues and
little about expenditures. If government obligations were local services or social services for
citizens within a country, then there may be no need for a European-wide tax policy. If the
obligations are European defense, then there may be some need for EU coordination. Do
the tax competition and coordination results depend critically on what is being nanced?
Tax policies are not simply tax rates but also include rules about tax exemption or
deferral. Changes in these rules can be as important as changes in statutory tax rates.
In the United States, for example, changes in laws governing the tax status of retirement
accounts had a signicant eect on eective income tax rates during the 1980s. If social
security systems in Europe are soon bankrupt, then we will see proposals promoting private
retirement saving. How would these savings incentives change the outcome of the tax
competition and tax coordination?
5. Conclusion
M-T take on two tough but highly relevant policy questions. What are the gains to tax
competition? What are the gains to tax cooperation? Their answer on the rst is tears
for continental Europe and cheers for the British. But that is in large part due to initial
conditions. The main message of this paper is that the gains to cooperation, at least in
these two-country static games, is very small.
Like all good papers, this paper makes me think that there is a lot of work still to
be done before we can get a better understanding of the outcomes of European nancial
integration.
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